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7.1 Introduction
In the early 1990s Argentina was the darling of international capital
markets and viewed by many as a model of reform for emerging markets.
Early in his presidency, Carlos Menem embarked on a bold set of economic
policies, including the adoption of a currency board that pegged the Ar-
gentine peso to the dollar, a sweeping privatization program for state-
owned enterprises, an overhaul of the banking system, and privatization of
the public pension system. The business press marveled over the rapid
turnaround in the Argentine economy. Although there were some concerns
about the appropriateness and sustainability of the dollar anchor and
whether the ﬁscal reforms were more rhetoric than reality, the policies ap-
peared to have conquered inﬂation and set the country on a course of
steady economic growth.
By the end of the 1990s, however, Argentina’s situation had dramatically
changed. The country had weathered the ﬁnancial crises in Mexico and
Asia, and, despite the volatility of capital ﬂows, Argentina’s currency
board remained intact and forecasts of future growth were relatively posi-
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tional Bureau of Economic Research.August 1998, which caused international investors to pull out of all emerg-
ing markets, seemingly with little regard for country-speciﬁc economic con-
ditions. More bad luck followed in January 1999 when Brazil, Argentina’s
major trading partner, devalued its currency, further weakening the com-
petitiveness of Argentine exports. Economic growth stalled, and unem-
ployment remained high. Despite the lowering of world interest rates, which
helped reduce the cost of external borrowing, the economy was teetering on
the brink of default. In 2001 the economy spiraled downward, and deposi-
tors scrambled to pull their savings out of the banking system. In a desper-
ate attempt to stave oﬀ disaster, the government imposed sweeping capital
controls. By 2002, Argentina was in complete political and economic col-
lapse. The currency board was abandoned, the exchange rate was devalued,
and eight years of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) were lost.
Argentina’s situation cannot be attributed solely to a run of bad luck.
Policy decisions made during the 1990s—and, just as important, policy in-
decision—made the country vulnerable to the kinds of shocks that aﬀected
all emerging markets. The inability to bring ﬁscal policy under control, the
incomplete reforms of the banking sector, and rigidities in the economy ul-
timately left the country with no good solutions. What the currency board
required—constraints on ﬁscal policy and complete abdication of mone-
tary policy—proved to be beyond the political capacity of the Argentine
government.
Much has been written about what happened to Argentina, why the cri-
sis happened when it did, and what might have been done to prevent it. Al-
though views diﬀer about the relative importance of the various factors
leading up to the collapse, there is general consensus that peso-dollar con-
vertibility was a double-edged sword: it eﬀectively bought the country
credibility and eradicated inﬂation, but at too high a price. Argentina’s ex-
perience reveals two major problems with currency boards. The ﬁrst is re-
ﬂected in the relationship between the credibility of the currency board and
capital ﬂows. Argentina inadvertently entered into a vicious circle with ﬁ-
nancial markets, one in which it felt compelled to raise the exit costs from
the currency board in order to maintain the regime’s credibility. The Ar-
gentine government raised exit costs by issuing its own debt in dollars and
by facilitating dollarization in the private sector (for example, by adopting
prudential norms in the banking system that biased deposits and loans to-
ward dollars rather than pesos). As exit costs mounted, ﬁnancial markets
became increasingly concerned about the dire implications of a devalua-
tion, which in turn compelled the government to raise exit costs further.
A second, related issue has to do with the inescapable link between ﬁs-
cal and monetary policy. In retrospect, it now seems clear that the lack of
coordination between the ﬁscal policies of the central government and the
provinces played a critical role in bringing about the failure of the currency
board. By 1999, the economy was in a deep recession, with low growth and
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ing of monetary policy (i.e., a devaluation) or ﬁscal stimulus. But either
spelled disaster. A devaluation would clearly undermine the currency
board, and a rise in government debt would raise suspicions that it would
eventually be monetized, further undermining the value of the peso. Ulti-
mately, fears of a devaluation resulted in more dollarization and more
strain on the banking sector. The added pressure of capital outﬂow, ﬁrst by
international investors and then by the withdrawal of deposits from the Ar-
gentine banking system, eventually tipped the scales.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the major eco-
nomic events in Argentina from the adoption of the Convertibility Plan in
1991 to the collapse of the exchange rate regime in 2001. Section 7.2 re-
views the key components of the Convertibility Plan and the responses of
ﬁnancial markets and the macroeconomy to the economic and ﬁnancial re-
forms embodied in the plan. Section 7.3 describes the set of external shocks
that buﬀeted the economy between 1994 and 1999. Section 7.4 reviews the
set of policy decisions and reforms that took place over that period. Sec-
tion 7.5 examines the unwinding of these reforms: the imposition of capi-
tal controls, channels used by Argentines to evade controls, and the conse-
quent collapse of the Convertibility Plan and the economy in 2001. An
epilogue follows in section 7.6, and a chronology of economic and political
events in Argentina from 1989 through 2005 is provided in the appendix.
7.2 The Convertibility Plan
On July 9, 1989, Carlos Menem assumed the Argentine presidency in the
ﬁrst peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected leader to
another since 1928.1 He assumed the oﬃce six months ahead of schedule,
however, due to the social and economic crisis that engulfed the country.
The Austral Plan, adopted in May 1985, had replaced the peso with a new
currency, and prices, wages, and utility rates had been frozen in an attempt
to stabilize inﬂation. Figure 7.1 shows monthly inﬂation and annual real
GDP, two key barometers of the health of the Argentine economy over the
1980–2004 period. The Austral Plan had temporarily slowed inﬂation but
did little to spur economic growth. During the period 1981–89, average
real GDP growth was negative at –0.7 percent, and real income in 1989 had
slid to 90 percent of its 1980 level.2 In the spring of 1989, inﬂation spiraled
out of control, and the Alfonsin government violently repressed mobs of
angry rioters and looters.
After eighteen months in oﬃce, the Menem government, under the guid-
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1. For a historical perspective on Argentina, see della Paolera and Taylor (2001, 2002,
2003b), Romero and Brennan (2002), Randall (1978), and Taylor (1998).
2. Growth in real GDP based on data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.ance of Domingo Cavallo as minister of the economy, implemented far-
reaching economic reforms. The capstone of the reform package was the
Convertibility Plan, which was designed to eliminate Argentina’s chronic
inﬂation and restore credibility to the Argentine peso.3 The plan pegged
the peso at a one-to-one parity with the U.S. dollar and required that two-
thirds of the monetary base be backed by international reserves. The re-
maining third could be backed by dollar-denominated Argentine central
bank securities at market prices, but holdings of those securities could not
expand by more than 10 percent per year.4 The plan eﬀectively converted
the central bank into a currency board that could issue domestic currency
only in exchange for foreign currency at a ﬁxed rate. The government en-
couraged dollarization by making it legal to write contracts in foreign cur-
rencies and allowing foreign currencies to be used as an alternative means
of payment. By 1994, over 60 percent of time deposits and 50 percent of
loans to the private sector were denominated in dollars.
Until the 1990s, trade barriers and restrictions on international invest-
ment had insulated the country from international markets. Another im-
portant component of the plan was the reduction in tariﬀs and other bar-
riers to trade in goods and the ﬂow of capital. Restrictions on the entry of
foreign banks were lifted. The banks faced high reserve requirements, and
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Fig. 7.1 Real GDP and inﬂation, 1980–2003
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
3. See Cavallo and Cottani (1997) and Cavallo (2003).
4. See Pou (2000) for a detailed description of the Convertibility Plan and the central bank
charter.to minimize moral hazard, deposit insurance was eliminated. Eﬀectively,
monetary policy for Argentina was set by the U.S. Federal Reserve, and the
Argentine central bank had very limited scope to operate as a lender of last
resort. Implications of this new role for the central bank are discussed in
more detail in section 7.4.2.
The Menem government also proceeded with the privatization of state-
owned ﬁrms and the deregulation of a number of industries, particularly in
the petroleum and gas, electricity, and communications sectors. According
to a study by Galiani et al. (2005), privatization dramatically increased the
proﬁtability, sales, and eﬃciency of nonﬁnancial as well as ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
One of the negative consequences of the increase in eﬃciency, however, was
employee layoﬀs. Galiani et al. (2005) estimate employment reductions of
about 40 percent as a result of privatization. One of the positive beneﬁts,
and the likely motivator for the privatization program, was the revenue ac-
crued by the central government. Some of the revenue from privatization
was used to ﬁnance another of the Menem government’s reforms: the tran-
sition from a pay-as-you-go social security system to privately managed re-
tirement saving accounts.
An additional beneﬁt of the privatization program was the jump start it
provided to ﬁnancial markets. Figure 7.2 shows the value of mergers and
acquisitions of Argentine companies from 1990 through 2003. In the ﬁrst
mergers and acquisitions boom, in 1992, some $8 billion in assets changed
hands, over 90 percent of which were in the electricity, gas, petroleum, and
telecommunications industries. The second boom occurred in 1997–99,
when a much larger fraction of Argentine assets was sold to foreign residents.
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Fig. 7.2 Mergers and acquisitions in Argentina, 1990–2003
Source:Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thompson’s International Mergers and Acquisi-
tions database.The government also took some initial steps toward addressing the ﬁs-
cal imbalances between the provincial and central government. Under the
system of ﬁscal federalism in Argentina, the bulk of revenue is raised by the
central government, while the provincial governments retain a large degree
of autonomy in allocating expenditures. Expenditures are covered through
a complicated system of intergovernmental transfers from the central gov-
ernment to the various provinces. Provincial governments also retained
some authority to issue bonds, eﬀectively backed by the central bank. In
1991–92, the Menem government was able to lower the transfer payments
to the provinces to help cover the costs of the pension reform.5
The market response to the economic reforms was swift and dramatic.
Table 7.1 provides summary statistics of Argentina’s macroeconomic per-
formance, government budget balance, and its balance of payments. GDP
growth picked up in 1991 and continued at levels above those of the rest of
Latin America through 1994. The currency board was eﬀective in taming
inﬂation—the mean level of inﬂation dropped from nearly 400 percent per
annum to a little under 10 percent in 1991–94 to almost zero in 1995–98.
The economic boom was fueled by increases in private consumption and
investment.
The lifting of controls also had a positive eﬀect on capital inﬂows and on
ﬁnancial markets. The U.S. investment position in Argentine equity rose
from virtually nothing in the 1980s to around $5 billion by end 1994,
roughly 14 percent of Argentine market capitalization. Figure 7.3 shows
the volume of capital inﬂow by type (portfolio equity ﬂows, long-term
debt, short-term debt, and foreign direct investment [FDI]) into Argentina
from 1986 through 2002. The country was eﬀectively in ﬁnancial autarky
prior to the Menem reforms, with the exception of sovereign borrowing.
That situation changed markedly in the 1990s. Capital inﬂows generally in-
creased in the 1990s, with some ups and downs in the 1994–99 period. The
cost of capital reﬂected in the Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI)
spread for Argentina hovered between 400 and 600 basis points from late
1993 through mid-1994.
The Convertibility Plan was far-reaching in scope and clearly had a pos-
itive impact on the economy. However, even at the time of its implementa-
tion, critics were quick to point out that it failed to grapple with some
structural problems. First, the plan failed to consolidate the budget con-
straint for the central government and the provinces. Second, there were
concerns that the banking reforms were not as deep as they needed to be
given the lack of a national lender of last resort. Third, labor market rigidi-
ties slowed the economy’s response to reforms. Fourth, the question re-
mained whether pegging to the dollar was a feasible long-term anchor for
the Argentine economy, particularly given that only a small share of
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.Argentine trade was with the United States. And ﬁnally, the plan, almost
by design, did not specify an exit strategy from the peg, if it were found to
be unsustainable in the long run. These issues would resurface precisely
when the Argentine economy weakened and would contribute to the cur-
rency board’s eventual collapse.6
7.3 External Shocks: Weathering the Storm, 1994–99
With hindsight it is easy to see that Argentina’s boom in the early 1990s,
with inﬂation under control and GDP growth on an upward path, was in
fact on precarious footing. Like that of many other Latin American coun-
tries, the Argentine savings rate was low, and with Argentine government
deﬁcits rising, Argentina was especially dependent on foreign capital to ﬁ-
nance new investments. Argentina’s vulnerability to shifts in external cap-
ital ﬂows was ﬁrst apparent in the aftermath of the Tequila crisis, and this
became especially worrisome by 1999, when Brazil devalued the real, and
foreign capital again abruptly stopped ﬂowing. The 1990s saw a number
of “star” emerging markets falter, Argentina among them. The ultimate
causes of the economic crises that shook Mexico in 1994, East Asia in
1997, Russia in 1998, and Brazil in 1999 are still under debate, but what is
clear is that each of the crises took its toll on Argentina.
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Fig. 7.3 Capital inﬂows to Argentina by type of ﬂow, 1986–2002
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.
6. See, among others, Bleaney (2004), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Edwards (2002), Feld-
stein (2002), Gurtner (2004), and Hausmann and Velasco (2002).7.3.1 The Tequila Financial Crises
The start of the so-called Tequila crisis is typically dated December 20,
1994, when the Mexican central bank was forced to widen its peso bands
in reaction to massive capital outﬂows, leading to an immediate 15 percent
devaluation of the peso relative to the dollar and further reserve outﬂows.
Two days later the peso was oﬃcially allowed to ﬂoat, and it continued to
lose value while peso interest rates sharply increased. The peso deprecia-
tions led to concern that the Mexican government would default on
Tesobonos (short-term government bonds denominated in pesos but in-
dexed to the dollar) and Mexican banks would fail (due to the large and
growing proportion of nonperforming ﬂoating interest rate loans).
These fears led to a chaotic exit of foreign and domestic investors, not
only from Mexico, but from most of Latin America.7Figure 7.4shows U.S.
net purchases of Latin American stocks and bonds, as well as net pur-
chases of Argentine securities. Two things stand out from the ﬁgure. First,
U.S. net purchases are highly correlated across Latin American countries.
Second, U.S. net purchases, which reﬂect a large fraction of total ﬂows to
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Fig. 7.4 Quarterly U.S. net purchases of bonds and equity in Latin America
Source: Treasury International Capital (TIC) system, U.S. Treasury Department.
7. On February 1, 1995, the IMF approved an external aid package for Mexico (which in-
cluded $20 billion from the United States, $18 billion from the IMF, $10 billion from the Bank
of International Settlements and $2 billion from commercial banks) which restored investor
conﬁdence in the Mexican government’s ability to honor the Tesobono contracts. Mexico an-
nounced a stringent austerity package in early March, and by July it reentered international
capital markets and sold $11 billion in two-year dollar-denominated notes at 11 percent, an
interest rate well below the rates of 20  percent on Tesobonos sold in January 1995.this region, are highly volatile and are responsive to ﬁnancial crises in Latin
America as well as in other regions. The Tequila crisis led to a fall in Brady
bond prices and stock exchange indexes in most Latin American countries.
Figure 7.5shows the increase in the EMBI spread, which jumped to nearly
2,000 basis points.
Argentina and Brazil were particularly hard hit by the exit of interna-
tional investors from Latin America. The Argentine Merval index fell 33
percent between December 1, 1994, and January 10, 1995, and Argentine
banks experienced signiﬁcant peso deposit withdrawals and substitutions
from peso to dollar accounts.8 Total (peso and dollar) deposits had in-
creased dramatically in Argentina between March 1991 and November
1994 as Argentines became more conﬁdent about the viability of the new
economic regime. At the end of 1994 the value of peso deposits in Ar-
gentina was just 9 percent lower than the value of dollar deposits. During
the Tequila crisis, total deposits in the Argentine banking system fell for
the ﬁrst time since the establishment of the Convertibility Plan, with the
decline falling disproportionately on peso deposits. After the Tequila cri-
sis, the dollarization of deposits steadily increased, so that by 2001 over 80
percent of time deposits were denominated in dollars.9A further indication
of the impact of the Tequila crisis on the Argentine banking system is ap-
parent in M3 (currency in pesos and deposits of pesos and dollars) growth,
which fell by 4.4 percent in 1995. Peso prime loan rates rose from 10.1 in
International Borrowing and Macroeconomic Performance in Argentina 307
Fig. 7.5 Emerging Market Bond Index spreads, 1992–2001
Source: JPMorgan (http://www.jpmorgan.com/MarketDataInd/EMBI/).
8. See De La Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler (2003) for a detailed description of the re-
actions of Argentine depositors and the banking sector to the Tequila crisis.
9. Demand deposits remained largely denominated in pesos, while approximately 40 per-
cent of savings deposits were dollarized in the 1990s. The large increase in deposit dollariza-
tion occurred in time deposits, which were already 60 percent dollarized in 1992.1994 to 17.8 percent in 1995, and spreads between the peso interest rate
and dollar interest rate widened by over 50 basis points. Argentine central
bank international reserves fell by 18 percent in the ﬁrst six months of
1995.
The Argentine government responded to the deterioration of its ﬁnan-
cial markets by putting in place a number of banking-sector reforms.10 On
December 28, 1994, it reduced reserve requirements on dollar deposits in
order to provide more liquidity to the banking system. In mid-January re-
serve requirements on peso deposits were also lowered. A special security
fund managed by Banco Nacion (the largest government bank), made up
of ﬁve private institutions and two public banks and funded with reserve
requirements, was set up to assist institutions that suﬀered high deposit
withdrawals. (Recall that the Argentine central bank could not serve as a
lender of last resort under the convertibility law.) In February 1995 the
Trust Fund for Provincial Development was set up to help support the
provincial banks. In March a similar Trust Fund for Bank Capitalization
was established, and changes were made to the central bank charter to al-
low it to use repurchases and rediscounts to help troubled banks. In the
same month, Argentina entered into new loan agreements with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American
Development Bank and issued new bonds (for a total of $7 billion) to in-
crease international reserves and to fund the trust funds. In April a deposit
insurance network was put in place, which covered up to $20,000 per per-
son (later raised to $30,000) for certain bank deposits.
In the midst of the aftershocks of the Tequila crisis, President Menem
won reelection in May 1995, and the run on Argentina’s banks ended. Ar-
gentina’s recovery from 1995 to 1996 was remarkably swift. GDP growth
rallied from –3.6 percent in 1995 to 5.4 percent in 1996, led by investment
and exports. However, this new growth did little to improve the ﬁscal situ-
ation; the government deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP remained stable at
1.3 percent over this period, and the ratio of external debt to exports stayed
at just under 340 percent (see table 7.1).
While the Tequila crisis and its implications for capital ﬂows were clearly
unlucky for Argentina, the crisis was followed by some good luck in the
form of U.S. and Brazilian policy spillovers. The Federal Reserve shifted
toward more expansionary monetary policy in early 1995, leading to a fall
in U.S. interest rates and a sharp depreciation in the U.S. dollar, in turn im-
proving Argentine competitiveness in world markets. At the same time
Brazil, Argentina’s main trading partner, experienced a rise in the value of
the real, further strengthening Argentina’s relative position. These good
external shocks allowed Argentina to recover much more quickly than
308 Kathryn M. E. Dominguez and Linda L. Tesar
10. See Dabos and Gomez-Mera (1998) for a detailed description of the post–Tequila cri-
sis banking reforms.many had anticipated, and perhaps lulled Argentine policymakers and in-
vestors into a false sense of security. Mussa (2002) goes so far as to suggest
that “were it not for the substantial improvements in bank soundness and
for the external good luck, the Convertibility Plan might not have survived
the Tequila crisis” (p. 21).
7.3.2 The Asian Crisis
There is little evidence of spillover from the Asian crisis to Latin Amer-
ica until October 1997 after the attack on the Hong Kong dollar. Interna-
tional bond issues from Latin America declined to less than $4 billion in
the fourth quarter of 1997, compared to $20 billion during the previous
quarter. Figure 7.4 shows that U.S. net purchases of stocks and bonds in
Latin America plummeted from a peak of $8 billion in the summer of 1997
to zero in the fourth quarter. U.S. net purchases in Argentina, however, re-
mained positive. Stock indexes fell throughout the emerging markets, with
Brazil being the hardest hit, apparently because of its large current account
deﬁcit and overvalued currency. At the same time, Argentina was consid-
ered doubly vulnerable because of its ﬁxed exchange rate and its depen-
dence on Brazil as a trading partner. Portfolio equity ﬂows to Argentina
fell 380 percent, and FDI ﬂows fell by 23 percent between 1997 and 1998,
although the net ﬂow of long-term debt increased by 47 percent. Overall,
net capital ﬂows to Argentina over this period actually rose by 5 percent,
because the sharp decline in portfolio and FDI investment was outweighed
by the increase in long-term debt, which accounted for a larger share of the
total. The Argentine government’s only policy reaction to the Asian crisis
was the introduction of the “antibubble” rule, which increased the capital
requirement for new mortgage loans when a nationwide real estate price
index surpassed certain thresholds.
7.3.3 The Russian Default
Just as emerging markets were beginning to recover from the Asian cri-
sis, news that Russia would default on its sovereign bonds in August 1998
sent markets reeling once again. Few investors imagined that Russia would
not be bailed out, and investors quickly realized that if Russia was to de-
fault, other vulnerable emerging markets would likely follow. The news
from Russia was a disaster for stock market investors in Argentina, as the
Merval plummeted 40 percent between August and September 1998.
Private capital inﬂows to Argentina, which had already slowed in the
aftermath of the Asian crisis, now turned negative in the fourth quarter of
1998. From July to August 1998, the spread on Argentine sovereign bonds
almost tripled. Throughout the fall, the spread remained about 400 basis
points higher than the spread that prevailed in July 1998, and this, in turn,
led domestic peso and dollar interest rates to rise sharply.
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) suggest that the dramatic stop in in-
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foreign debt repudiation provides strong evidence in favor of contagion-
based (and against traditional ﬁscal-based) explanations for ﬁnancial
ﬂows. Countries that had little or no ﬁnancial or trading ties to Russia,
such as Argentina and Brazil, found that their access to external capital
had suddenly been cut oﬀ.
7.3.4 Brazilian Devaluation
While Argentina was badly aﬀected by the general exit of investors from
emerging markets, Brazil—already hard hit by the Asian crisis—was dealt
a knockout blow.11 On January 13, 1999, Gustavo Franco, the governor of
the Brazilian central bank, resigned; and the government announced a
widening of the ﬂuctuation band for the real. This was tantamount to a de-
valuation of the real of 8 percent. The ﬁnancial reaction in Argentina to the
Brazilian devaluation was immediate. Argentine interest rates rose sharply,
the Merval plummeted, and Argentina was eﬀectively shut out of global ﬁ-
nancial markets.
Many observers, at least with hindsight, date the beginning of the Argen-
tine economic crisis in 2001 to the Brazilian devaluation (which, in turn, may
have been set oﬀby the Russian default). Brazil was Argentina’s major trad-
ing partner, and the combination of Brazil’s economic woes, which would
surely reduce its import demand from Argentina, and the exit of interna-
tional capital ﬂows from the region had serious implications for Argentina.
Returning to ﬁgure 7.3, we see that that short-term lending and portfolio
equity ﬂows to Argentina—whose trend had generally been rising through-
out the 1990s, with short-term reversals after the Mexican and Asian
crises—sharply plummeted in 1999. Total capital ﬂows into Argentina re-
mained positive, primarily because of an unprecedented inﬂow of FDI. In-
terestingly, 64 percent of the inﬂow of FDI in that year is due to the acqui-
sition of a single company, YPF, by Repsol, a Spanish company (see ﬁgure
7.6). Netting out the YPF transaction, capital inﬂows would have remained
positive in 1999 but would drop to $5 billion from $20 billion.
In a series of papers Guillermo Calvo and various coauthors make the
case that severe capital ﬂow reversals, such as that experienced by Ar-
gentina in 1999–2000, can be triggers of subsequent economic crisis.12Fur-
ther, Calvo suggests that three factors in particular exacerbate an econ-
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11. While portfolio ﬂows to all emerging market countries fell dramatically after the Rus-
sia default, FDI ﬂows were less uniform. Noteworthy in this regard is the fact that FDI ﬂows
to Brazil rose substantially in dollar terms from mid-1998 to mid-2001. Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Talvi (2003) suggest that it was in part these FDI ﬂows that allowed Brazil to recover so
quickly from the Russian crisis–induced sudden stop. Other factors in Brazil’s favor were the
facts that its public debt was only partially dollarized and that substantial ﬁscal retrenchment
was politically feasible.
12. See, for example, Calvo (1998), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003), and Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004).omy’s vulnerability to “sudden stops”:13 the pre-stop level of indebtedness,
the degree of domestic liability dollarization, and the dependence on ﬁ-
nancing from abroad to pay for imports. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003)
argue that the Argentine economy in the 1990s had just the characteristics
that would lead it to be hard hit in the advent of a sudden stop. Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) date Argentina’s sudden stop as starting in
May 1999.
The sudden-stop literature suggests that it is the capital ﬂows (or lack
thereof) themselves that are pivotal. In theory, a sudden stop in capital
ﬂows could arise from external factors, such as contagion or margin calls
that arise from economic crises that are unrelated to the country in ques-
tion.14Internal factors can either mitigate or magnify the eﬀects of the sud-
den stop on the economy. In countries like Argentina, with a small share of
tradable goods output relative to domestic absorption of tradable goods, a
sudden stop in capital ﬂows requires a sharp increase in the equilibrium
real exchange rate to transform the current account deﬁcit into a surplus.15
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Fig. 7.6 FDI inﬂow and foreign acquisitions of Argentine companies
Source:FDI data from Global Development Finance, World Bank. Mergers and acquisitions
data from SDC Thompson’s International Mergers and Acquisitions database.
13. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) deﬁne a sudden stop as a sharp decline in capital
ﬂows that meets the following three criteria: (a) it contains at least one observation where the
year-on-year fall in capital ﬂows lies at least 2 standard deviations below its sample mean; (b)
it ends once the annual change in capital ﬂows exceeds 1 standard deviation below its sample
mean; and (c) the start is determined by the ﬁrst time the annual change in capital ﬂows falls
1 standard deviation below the mean.
14. For a further discussion of the potential role of margin calls in sudden stops see Men-
doza and Smith (2002).
15. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) calculate that Argentina would have needed to de-
preciate its equilibrium real exchange rate by a whopping 46 percent in 1998 in order to bring
its current account into balance.If the country also has large ﬁnancial currency denomination mismatches
(for example, liability dollarization), the real depreciation will in turn lead
to a weakening of corporate—and, in the case of Argentina, govern-
ment—balance sheets.16
Argentina’s experience immediately following the Russian default closely
follows the sudden-stop logic. With the falloﬀ in capital inﬂows, investors
and (perhaps most important) oﬃcial creditors realized that the sustain-
ability of Argentina’s ﬁscal situation, though still not dramatically diﬀerent
from what it had been a year previous, was precarious. Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Talvi (2003) estimate that “once all the elements triggered by the sud-
den stop are factored in (valuation eﬀects, interest rate increases, growth
slowdown, and emergence of contingent liabilities from the private sector),
the primary ﬁscal balance needed to regain sustainability would have ex-
ceeded 3% of GDP” in 1998 (p. 32). The political economy implications of
this for the Menem government, which was in its ﬁnal year, were dire.
7.3.5 Reduction in World Interest Rates
Argentina was on the brink of economic collapse in early 1999, but just
as had been the case after the Tequila crisis, Argentina was dealt a positive
shock in the second half of 1999 that allowed it to make another surpris-
ing, even if temporary, recovery.
In this case Argentina’s rescue came from an unusual source: conditions
in European ﬁnancial markets. As European governments strove to meet
the Mastricht criteria in the run-up to the establishment of the euro, inter-
est rates—which had been relatively high in a number of European coun-
tries—converged downward. This sent investors seeking higher yields to
alternative markets. Argentina recognized this potential market niche and
successfully ﬂoated (high-yield) sovereign debt denominated in euros dur-
ing this period. As Mussa (2002) points out, “the success of Argentina in
ﬂoating substantial amounts of sovereign debt in global credit markets
during much of 1999 and the ﬁrst half of 2000 testiﬁes both to the special
conditions in those markets and to Argentine authorities’ particularly deft
management of public debt” (p. 25).
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16. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) estimate that Argentina had an extremely high de-
gree of public-sector debt mismatch in 1998. Their calculation for Argentina was 0.01 on a 
1–0 scale with 1 representing a perfect match and zero representing the highest degree of mis-
match. Given this level of currency mismatch, the authors indicate that had there been a real
depreciation of 46 percent (the amount needed to balance the current account), Argentina
would have had a debt-GDP ratio of just under 50 percent assuming no increase in interest
rates and no fall in growth rates. If the contingent liabilities of the public sector that arose out
of the (also highly dollarized) corporate and banking sectors are included, the debt-GDP ra-
tio rises to well over 50 percent. 
Government policy can, in principle, oﬀset the negative eﬀects of a sudden stop–induced
real appreciation on corporate balance sheets by providing the private sector with additional
collateral. Korea, with the help of the IMF, was able to mitigate the eﬀects of the Asian cri-
sis–induced sudden stop in this manner.7.4 Internal Policy Mistakes
At the same time that Argentina was buﬀeted, in both positive and neg-
ative directions, by external shocks, internal policies had a major inﬂuence
on the economy. The role of ﬁscal policy in the lead-up to Argentina’s eco-
nomic collapse is perhaps the most controversial. Mussa (2002) and the
IMF (2003, 2004) emphasize failure in ﬁscal policy as the root cause of the
crisis. Others suggest that ﬁscal policy was either less crucial or, in some
views, irrelevant. Another area of controversy is the role of the banking
sector in the ultimate collapse of the economy, and in particular the cur-
rency mismatches between dollar deposits and peso-denominated assets.
7.4.1 Untamed Fiscal Policy
Out of context, Argentina’s ﬁscal numbers do not suggest much reason
for concern. In 1993 public debt was 28 percent of GDP, inﬂation was un-
der control, and GDP growth could arguably have been expected to con-
tinue at 6–7 percent. It was in this seemingly robust ﬁscal environment that
the Argentine government decided to privatize its social security system,
which produced an extra annual bill equal to 1.5 percent of GDP (roughly
$2 billion based on GDP in 1995), although in the long run the privatiza-
tion was expected to save the government money. Other privatization
eﬀorts in the period 1993–98 resulted in $2.9 billion in nonrecurring rev-
enues. By 1998 the Argentine public debt had risen to $112 billion (the ra-
tio of public debt to GDP had risen to 37 percent), which in a broader con-
text might still be considered moderate.
Mussa (2002) points out, however, that this rise in public debt should
have been worrisome because it occurred during a period of relatively high
economic growth, it included a number of one-oﬀ revenue increases due to
privatizations, and it would have looked worse but for the fact that Brady
bond restructuring in 1993 involved substantial back-loading of interest
payments, and “a good deal of public sector borrowing was not included
in the budget” (Mussa 2002, p. 16).17An assessment of the Argentine ﬁscal
situation is further complicated by the role of provincial government
spending, which is not subject to a balanced-budget rule. While provincial
expenditures generally totaled less than 12 percent of GDP per year, the
system of Argentine ﬁscal federalism provided little incentive for provinces
to reduce spending.18
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17. Perry and Serven (2003) show that if an equilibrium real exchange rate (rather than the
one-for-one peso-dollar rate) is used in the calculation, the public-sector debt-GDP ratio in
2001 rises by 24 percent.
18. Expenditures in the provinces rose steadily in the late 1990s, while transfers from the
central government remained ﬁxed as a constant proportion of tax revenue, which led to
widening provincial deﬁcits. See Cuevas (2003) for a discussion of reforming intergovern-
mental transfers.Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) describe Argentina, which
has defaulted on its debts ﬁve times since 1820, as a “serial defaulter.”
They show that serial defaulters can develop debt intolerance, where the
risk of default begins to skyrocket at debt levels that might be quite man-
ageable for countries with less checkered credit records. Argentina ap-
pears, in their calculations, to hit debt intolerance at debt-GDP ratios of
only 25–30 percent, so that alarm bells should have been ringing well be-
fore 1998.
It is also worth remembering that Argentina’s public debt during the
1990s was almost entirely denominated in foreign currencies, reﬂecting its
limited ability to issue long-term debt in its own currency, itself a reﬂection
of the fact that the convertibility regime encouraged dollar-denominated
debt.19As with other emerging market economies, Argentina could borrow
only at sizable spreads over U.S. treasuries, and a negative shift in market
sentiment generally resulted in higher interest rates, creating potentially
explosive debt dynamics even at relatively modest levels of debt.20
At the same time that debt-GDP ratios should have sounded alarms
(and, indeed, seem not to have sounded alarms at the IMF until it was too
late), Argentina’s debt-export ratio should also have provided cause for
concern. One of the costs of the currency board was a chronic overvalua-
tion of the peso. Figure 7.7 shows that in the period 1991–93 the real eﬀec-
tive peso exchange rate appreciated by almost 25 percent.21 Between 1996
and 1997 the world price of Argentina’s commodity exports fell by 20 per-
cent, followed by a further decline of equal size in 1998.22 By the end of
1998 Argentina’s debt-export ratio was at 379 percent, and debt service
payments alone absorbed the majority of annual export earnings. In 1999,
in the wake of the Brazilian devaluation, export growth fell by over 9 per-
cent, and the debt-export ratio rose to 427 percent.
Finally, the Convertibility Plan did not stop the Argentine government
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19. The Argentine government did not issue peso-denominated debt, both because peso
debt was more expensive (peso interest rates were always higher than dollar interest rates) and
to avoid the appearance of hedging against the collapse of the Convertibility Plan. Eichen-
green, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003) suggest that the diﬃculty emerging market economies
face in issuing debt in local currency can be traced to one of two (similar though distinct) phe-
nomena: original sin or debt intolerance. Original sin implies that the problem arises exter-
nally, with the structure of global portfolios and international ﬁnancial markets, while debt
intolerance implies that the problem arises internally, with weak institutions. In either case,
the authors term the consequence of these problems “currency mismatches.” See also Bordo,
Meissner, and Redish (2004) and Rigobon (2002).
20. See, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco
(2004) and Galiani, Levy Yeyati, and Schargrodsky (2003).
21. See Dubas, Lee, and Mark (2005).
22. Another aspect of Argentina’s trade patterns that increased its vulnerability was the fact
that Mercosur, established in 1991 (which created a free-trade zone among Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia), probably led to trade diversion and a less diversiﬁed
trade market. Argentina went from trading around 20 percent with Mercosur partners in
1991 to 45 percent in 1998 (with the bulk of exports going to Brazil).from attempting to monetize its debts. Once foreign capital had been ex-
hausted, the Argentine government, though unable to directly print pesos,
did the next best thing by issuing small-denomination federal bonds re-
deemable for federal tax payments. These bonds were called “lecop” (for
letras de cancelación de obligaciones provinciales) and were considered
quasi-money. Many of the provinces followed the federal government’s
lead and printed their own versions of quasi-money to pay for ﬁscal
deﬁcits. For example, the province of Buenos Aires issued “Patacón,” and
Córdoba issued “Lecor.” In December 2001 quasi-monies issued by the
federal government and the provinces exceeded 24 percent of pesos in cir-
culation.
7.4.2 The Role of the Banks
The convertibility regime required an especially strong banking and ﬁ-
nancial system because restrictions on monetary policy prevented the cen-
tral bank from acting as a lender of last resort through money creation.23
In the aftermath of the Tequila crisis, when banks experienced massive de-
posit outﬂows, the Argentine government put in place a number of bank-
ing reforms to strengthen domestic banks, at the same time encouraging
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Fig. 7.7 Argentine real eﬀective exchange rate
Source: Dubas, Lee, and Nelson (2004).
Note: An increase indicates a peso appreciation relative to a trade-weighted basket of cur-
rencies.
23. There was a proviso in the Convertibility Plan law that allowed up to one-third of in-
ternational reserves to be made up of internationally traded, dollar-denominated Argentine
sovereign bonds, valued at market prices. This allowed a very limited “lender of last resort”
role since the central bank could provide the banking system with pesos in exchange for sov-
ereign Argentine bonds (rather than dollars).foreign banking institutions to enter the Argentine market.24 By the end of
the 1990s, Argentina was considered a model for other emerging market
economies in the area of banking supervision and prudential policy. Bank-
ing system assets doubled from only 20 percent of GDP in 1991 to 40 per-
cent of GDP in 1999.
At the same time that the Argentine government was instituting impor-
tant banking-sector reforms, it was also saddling its banks (and especially
public banks) with public-sector debt. Banking system exposure to the
public sector rose from about 10 percent of total assets in 1995 to more
than 20 percent by 2001. In April 2001 alone the government placed $2
billion of its debts with banks in Argentina, at the same time that the cen-
tral bank charter was amended in order to allow unlimited lender-of-last-
resort liquidity with the backing of government securities.25 The IMF
(2003) was concerned by this growing exposure, and writes that in the
1990s the Argentine “banking system was vulnerable to three forms of
shocks, all of which eventually materialized: economic downturn, devalu-
ation of the exchange rate, and default by the public sector.”
Under the currency board the Argentine banking system was heavily
exposed to a devaluation of the peso against the U.S. dollar.26 While most
bank assets and liabilities were matched in terms of their currency of de-
nomination, many dollar-denominated bank loans went to Argentine
companies and households that had earnings in pesos. A large devaluation
would make repayment of those loans diﬃcult.27
Wealthy Argentine residents have long kept bank accounts outside of
Argentina in case of economic crisis. It is estimated that Argentines held
over $100 billion abroad in the 1990s, which suggests that they considered
the risk of crisis (and presumably expropriation) to be substantial. Related
to this is the fact that credit from the banking system to the private sector,
which is generally low in Latin America, was particularly so in Argentina,
where bank loans to the private sector were only 23 percent of GDP at their
peak in 1999.
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24. Foreign-owned banks presumably contribute to a strengthening of the banking system,
because they are less tied to the domestic economy (and politics). In 1994 only 15 percent of
total Argentine banking system assets were held in foreign banks; this increased to 55 percent
in 1998 and 73 percent in 2000 (De La Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler 2003, p. 50). In the
midst of the Argentine crisis, however, foreign banks reacted to the increased ﬁnancial risk by
reducing their exposure, so their presence did little to improve the situation.
25. This amendment, ironically put in place by Domingo Cavallo, eﬀectively dismantled
the money-issuance rule under the Convertibility Plan. Cavallo had hoped that renewing the
central bank’s ability to serve as a lender of last resort would encourage banks to extend
credit, but it seemed to have only further weakened the credibility of the banking system.
26. It is worth noting, however, that prior to the imposition of capital controls in 2001 dol-
larization in the banking system was concentrated in longer-term bank deposits and loans.
Demand deposits (which were presumably used for transaction purposes) were largely de-
nominated in pesos throughout this period.
27. See De Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003) and della Paolera and Taylor (2003a) for fur-
ther discussion of the dollarization of the banking system.7.5 The Unwinding of Reforms
In December 1999, Fernando de la Rua was elected president and in-
herited a public debt in excess of $100 billion. The new government made
the decision to tighten ﬁscal policy with a series of tax increases, in the
hope that this would further reassure investors and help to lower interest
rates. But the tax increases only served to push a recovering economy back
into recession. The country teetered on the edge of default throughout
2000, but once again a good external shock in early 2001 steadied the Ar-
gentine economy. U.S. monetary policy loosened, leading to lower U.S. in-
terest rates and a weaker dollar. This in turn resulted in lower spreads on
Argentina’s bonds over U.S. treasuries and gave a boost to Argentina’s ex-
ports.
De la Rua’s contractionary ﬁscal policy received the endorsement of the
IMF. In March 2000, a three-year standby arrangement for $7.2 billion
was agreed to, and in January 2001 this was augmented by $13.7 billion. At
the same time, additional ﬁnancing of $39 billion was arranged from oﬃ-
cial and private sources. In September 2001, the IMF increased its loans to
Argentina by $22 billion, with up to $3 billion to be used in support of a
possible debt-restructuring operation.
However, it was too little and already too late. Argentines had begun to
shift from peso to dollar deposits starting in February 2001, and this trend
sharply increased during the fall of 2001, when outright withdrawals of de-
posits were observed throughout the banking sector. De la Torre, Levy
Yeyati, and Schmukler (2003) document that by November 2001, forty-
seven of the top ﬁfty banks had suﬀered major withdrawals. Between July
and November 2001, Argentines withdrew over $15 billion from banks: on
November 30, 2001, alone, banks saw withdrawals of $1.3 billion.
On December 3, 2001, in a desperate eﬀort to prevent further massive
capital outﬂows and to halt the run on banks, the government imposed
a set of draconian ﬁnancial controls. The capital control regime, termed
the Corralito (literally, “little corral,” but also “playpen”), limited with-
drawals from bank accounts to 250 pesos per week per account, but de-
positors could access their accounts to transfer funds within the bank-
ing system.28 Wire transfers required central bank approval, foreign
currency futures transactions were prohibited, and in eﬀect all investors,
foreign and domestic, were prohibited from transferring funds abroad.
Depositors could exchange dollars for government bonds, but few chose
to do so. The restrictions were announced as temporary measures that
would remain in place until the danger of the speculative attack had
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28. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was a sudden increase in the number of new bank ac-
counts in early December. The government promptly changed the regulations so that the de-
posit limits applied per person rather than per account. According to the press, some 500,000
accounts were opened in the two days following the imposition of bank restrictions.passed.29 The scheduled program review by the IMF was not completed,
and IMF support of Argentina was eﬀectively withdrawn. (A detailed
time line of the economic and political events that occurred during the
Corralito is provided in the appendix.)
On December 19, the ministers in President de la Rua’s cabinet resigned,
and the following day the president himself resigned.30 Ramon Puerta as-
sumed the presidency in the interim as Argentine country risk skyrocketed
(see ﬁgure 7.5, where the EMBI spread for Argentina rises from 4,000 in
November to just under 10,000 at the end of December 2001). Foreign ex-
change trading was suspended on December 21. A new interim president,
Rodriguez Saa, was named on December 23. Saa promptly declared a
moratorium on the country’s $155 billion public foreign currency debt,
making it the largest sovereign debt default in history. Saa resigned after
just one week, and President Eduardo Duhalde assumed power on De-
cember 30.
In January the Argentine peso was oﬃcially devalued, and all bank de-
posits and debts were “pesoﬁed.” Dollar deposits were converted at 1.4 pe-
sos to the dollar, while dollar loans were subject to one-to-one conversions,
eﬀectively imposing the bulk of the costs of pesoﬁcation on the banks
rather than depositors. The situation of the banks was made worse by the
fact that they remained exposed to foreign exchange risk on foreign liabil-
ities, which were not pesoﬁed. Gutierrez and Montes-Negret (2004) esti-
mate that the banking system had a negative net worth of at least $32 bil-
lion in January 2002. To compensate the banks, the government issued new
bonds called BODENs, which to date are illiquid (and their economic
value is contingent on future debt restructuring and the government’s ﬁs-
cal sustainability).
Given the political and economic chaos, the payment system ceased to
function. Citizens took to the streets in protest of the economic conditions,
and the foreign banks became a focus for their rage. The number of re-
ported bankruptcies by ﬁrms and individuals reached record proportions.
Growth in real GDP, consumption, and investment turned sharply nega-
tive, and the current account deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP swung from
–1.4 percent in 2001 to 2.9 percent in 2002.
The one market in Argentina that did not collapse amid the economic
crisis was the stock market. Indeed, the Argentine stock market expanded
by 50 percent immediately following the imposition of capital controls.
One potential explanation of the stock market boom in Argentina is that
investors viewed the likely devaluation of the peso as beneﬁcial for ﬁrms,
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29. Some of the original withdrawal limits were eventually modiﬁed, although the main re-
strictions on capital outﬂow remained in place until December 2, 2002 (exactly one year af-
ter they were ﬁrst introduced).
30. The resigning cabinet ministers included Domingo Cavallo, who had left public oﬃce
in 1996 and returned to the position of economic minister with the de la Rua administration.although in other countries such crises are generally harmful. A more
plausible explanation is that the idiosyncratic reaction of the Argentine
stock market was due largely to the speciﬁc restrictions in the Corralito
that allowed investors to use their frozen bank deposits to purchase Ar-
gentine stocks, and inadvertently provided a legal mechanism for avoiding
the capital controls through the purchase of Argentine stocks that were
cross-listed in the United States, termed American depository receipts
(ADRs).31
Auguste et al. (2006) document how the ADR loophole worked in prac-
tice. Under the Corralito,Argentine residents were allowed to use bank de-
posits in excess of the $1,000 monthly ceiling to purchase Argentine stocks.
If a stock happened to be cross-listed in the United States, those shares
could be legally converted from Argentine shares into ADRs. The ADRs
could then be sold in the United States and the dollar proceeds deposited
in a U.S. account. Under normal circumstances an ADR sale would result
in Argentina experiencing a capital inﬂow, as U.S. residents have acquired
claims on Argentine ﬁrms. Under the Corralito, however, the capital in-
ﬂows did not occur, and the dollars and/or shares remained outside of
Argentina. In eﬀect, the ADR loophole allowed Argentines to transfer
monies abroad, but the transactions did not result directly in a fall in Ar-
gentina’s international reserves (or a fall in Argentine bank deposits).
ADR conversions, however, did reduce the number of (underlying) shares
available on the local stock exchange in Buenos Aires, La Bolsa.
Auguste et al. (2006) examine local share prices relative to their corre-
sponding ADRs over the period when capital controls were in place. They
ﬁnd that Argentine investors were willing to pay a substantial price to move
their deposits out of Argentina through ADR conversions. At their peak,
some ADRs were trading at a discount of in excess of 40 cents on the 
dollar.
The existence of ADRs not only allowed Argentines to circumvent the
capital controls put in place by the government during the economic crisis
in 2001, but they also provided a shadow foreign exchange market during
a period when the oﬃcial foreign exchange market was closed. Auguste et
al. (2006) estimate that the average expected devaluation of the peso im-
plicit in ADR prices in January 2002 did a good job predicting the magni-
tude of the oﬃcial devaluation, which was 40 percent.
Transaction data can be used to estimate the volume of wealth transfer
from Argentina to the United States via ADRs. The most accurate mea-
sure would be to use the volume of ADR conversions that occurred after
the imposition of the Corralito.The New York Stock Exchange collects the
number of ADR conversions on a quarterly basis, which unfortunately
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31. See Levy Yeyati, Schmukler, and van Horen (2003) for a further discussion of the stock
market boom during the Corralito.makes it impossible to back out the number of conversions during the peak
period of December 2001 and January 2002. The data suggest that between
the end of December 2001 and the end of March 2002, approximately 26
million shares of Argentine stock were converted to ADRs. Since we do not
know in which month those shares were converted, and because share
prices changed dramatically in this period, it is diﬃcult to assign a value to
this ﬂow.
An alternative measure of the volume of wealth transfer is the post-
Corralito cumulated volume of sales of Argentine ADRs in New York, un-
der the assumption that all ADR sales reﬂect cashing out by Argentine
investors. This ﬁgure comes to $835 million.32 This is likely to be an under-
estimate of the volume of outﬂow, since many investors may simply hold
the stock rather than sell at depressed prices. Another measure is the cu-
mulated volume of purchases of local stocks with associated ADRs in
Buenos Aires over this period. Under the assumption that all these pur-
chases are intended for ADR conversion, the value of wealth transfer comes
to $3.4 billion. This is probably an overestimate, since Argentines may have
had other reasons for purchasing these stocks besides ADR convertibility.
On the one hand, a capital ﬂow of even $3.4 billion is small given the
magnitude of the crisis and the desire of Argentines to ﬁnd a way to move
wealth abroad. On the other hand, the fact that the volume is small is con-
sistent with the fact that, unlike many unoﬃcial channels for capital out-
ﬂow, the value of the ADR loophole was priced by the market. It appears
that the increase in local share prices eﬀectively choked oﬀ the ﬂow. This
may have been why, in the midst of all of the other events taking place dur-
ing the Corralito, the government did not appear to be much concerned
about closing the ADR loophole.
ADRs were not the only legal means by which Argentines could cir-
cumvent the Corralito. CEDEARs (certiﬁcados de depositos Argentinos)
are shares of non-Argentine ﬁrms (mostly U.S. ﬁrms) that are cross-listed
on the Argentine exchange and sold for pesos. Before the imposition of the
Corralito Argentine investors should have preferred to hold foreign stocks
directly (and in dollars) rather than as a CEDEAR in pesos, especially
given that they had to pay high conversion fees for the CEDEARs. How-
ever, after the imposition of the Corralito we might have expected Ar-
gentine demand for CEDEARs to have increased because underlying
CEDEAR assets are denominated in dollars (although CEDEARs are
priced in pesos), and because holding shares of non-Argentine ﬁrms would
serve as a better means of hedging against the looming economic crisis.
The supply of CEDEARs, however, did not immediately pick up, in large
part because Argentine brokers were initially not able to send dollars
abroad to buy the underlying stocks and convert them to CEDEARs, and
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32. This is the cumulated sum between December 1, 2001, and May 31, 2002.there was little incentive for investors outside of Argentina to convert U.S.
stocks into peso-denominated CEDEARs before the devaluation.33
Figure 7.8 indicates that starting in late February 2002, however, liquid-
ity in CEDEAR stocks gradually increased (just as trading in ADRs starts
to fall oﬀ). Discussions with brokers in Argentina suggest that the increase
in CEDEAR liquidity came from two sources. First, using operations called
“via cable,” brokers bought foreign bank checks that allowed them to pur-
chase the underlying U.S. shares, convert these into CEDEARs, and then
sell the CEDEARs (at a premium) in Argentina for pesos.34Second, mutual
funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors are required to hold
assets rated above BBB, and at this time all Argentine stocks and bonds
were below the minimum ranking, forcing these funds to purchase non-
Argentine securities. Since the Corralito disallowed direct purchases of for-
eign assets, CEDEARs were among the few assets that they could acquire.
Once liquidity in the CEDEAR market was established, investors had an
alternative means of escaping the Corralito, by purchasing CEDEARs in
Argentina for pesos, converting them back to the underlying dollar de-
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33. Traders had little incentive to convert U.S. stocks into CEDEARs prior to the devalua-
tion, both because of peso value uncertainty and because the Corralitorestricted repatriation
of any peso returns.
34. Another way that CEDEARs may have been created is through a practice termed pre-
releasing, where the depositary bank lends out the underlying securities that make up the
CEDEAR to brokers in the market. The brokers then sell the CEDEARs to investors who pay
in pesos and then request that the broker convert the CEDEARs back into the underlying U.S.
shares (and sell them in New York for dollars).
Fig. 7.8 Trading volume in ADRs and in CEDEARs as a percentage of total
trading volume
Source: Bolsar (http://www.bolsar.com).nominated stocks, and selling them in New York for dollars (that then were
deposited in dollar accounts).35 The transaction costs of CEDEAR con-
version are similar to those in the ADR market, and the increased demand
for CEDEARs in Argentina led to similar price spreads on CEDEARs in
Argentina relative to the underlying prices of the stocks in New York. Be-
fore the Corralito, the mean CEDEAR discount was approximately zero,
but during the period March 2002 through September 2002 the average
discount increased to 3.3 percent (excluding transaction costs) with a max-
imum increase of 13 percent.36
There is clear indication that the Argentine government understood that
CEDEARs were serving a purpose similar to that of ADRs in allowing in-
vestors to transfer funds (legally) outside of Argentina. On March 25, 2002,
a report in the oﬃcial central bank press communication suggests that the
government considered adopting new measures to avoid capital outﬂows us-
ing ADR and CEDEAR transactions. However, no restrictions were imposed
at that time. In September 2002, regulations were changed that increased the
cost and diﬃculty of CEDEAR conversions.37CEDEAR discounts increased
substantially after September 2002, which reﬂects the increased costs associ-
ated with shifting capital abroad through this mechanism.
Argentina appears to be a unique case in which a country with a signiﬁ-
cant number of cross-listed stocks and relatively well-integrated ﬁnancial
markets subsequently attempted to close its ﬁnancial borders. The unusual
set of circumstances in Argentina gave cross-listed shares (ADRs and
CEDEARs) a new, and previously unstudied, role as a mechanism for cap-
ital ﬂight. Further, the Argentine case suggests that, once having estab-
lished ADRs and other kinds of contractual arrangements across markets,
it may be diﬃcult if not impossible to reverse the process of capital market
integration with (even draconian) capital controls.
7.6 Epilogue
The Corralito, which oﬃcially ended on December 2, 2002, with its ab-
rogation of individual and corporate property rights, resulted in a massive
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35. Investors also purchased (in pesos) dollar-denominated Argentine government bonds
(speciﬁcally Global 2008s) and resold them in New York (for dollars) for similar reasons. It
is interesting to note that the two most frequently traded CEDEARs in the post-Corralitope-
riod, Lockheed and Avon, were rarely traded before the capital controls were imposed. The
apparent reason for this shift in preference is that they both have low conversion ratios and
high dollar prices (for the underlying shares) in the United States, which in turn meant that
these securities sold at high prices in pesos in Argentina. Higher nominal peso prices meant
that fewer of these CEDEARs had to be acquired to transfer a given amount of funds (and
with fewer transactions, investors incur lower conversion costs).
36. Liquidity for many of the CEDEARs in Buenos Aires remained low even after March
2002. In our calculations we include the 15 most frequently traded CEDEARs (out of the 216
listed CEDEARs), and we calculate the discount for each of the CEDEARs only on the days
when there was a closing price in both markets. The index is then the average of the daily premia.
37. See the entry for September 2002 in the appendix.redistribution of wealth between depositors, lenders, and ﬁnancial institu-
tions. Not surprisingly, the question of who owed what to whom became a
matter for the courts and left the economy in a state of limbo. The courts
issued a number of injunctions to savers who demanded that their dollar
deposits be paid at the market exchange rate rather than the rate decreed
by the government of 1.4 pesos to the dollar, plus inﬂation. Honoring these
injunctions cost the banks an extra 7 billion pesos. The Supreme Court ﬁ-
nally ruled in October 2004 that the pesoﬁcation of dollar deposits that
took place in 2001 was legal, relieving the banks of large potential losses
from further injunctions.38 As a consequence of this recent history, most
bank deposits in Argentina are short term, which in turn limits the scope
for banks to lend long term. In early 2004, credit to the private sector
amounted to only 8 percent of GDP.
In May 2003 Nestor Kirchner, a populist nationalist, was sworn in as
president on a pointedly anti-IMF platform. In September, a day after
Argentina missed a $2.9 billion payment to the IMF (the single largest
nonpayment of a loan in the IMF’s history), Argentina signed a three-
year agreement with the IMF, which included a ﬁscal target of a primary
surplus of 3 percent of GDP in the ﬁrst year (coincidentally, exactly the
number Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi [2003] calculated as needed in 1998
to regain sustainability). In return the IMF agreed to lend Argentina
$12.5 billion, the amount that was due to the IMF over the period 2003–
6.39In 2005 Argentine GDP ﬁnally surpassed its previous precrisis peak.
In the summer of 2005 Argentina suspended its agreement with the IMF
and introduced a massive debt swap that involved an exchange for new
bonds worth roughly 35 cents on the dollar.40 In December 2005 Kirch-
ner said his government would repay early its entire $98.8 billion debt to
the IMF in order to be free of “further IMF restraint on Argentina’s
policies.”41
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38. The Supreme Court approved the conversion of ﬁxed-term savings in dollars to pesos—
known as “pesoﬁcation”—by ﬁve to one on October 26, 2004. The president of the court, En-
rique Petracchi, abstained from voting because his savings were caught in the freeze on bank
accounts when the crisis broke out.
39. The IMF’s lending to Argentina makes up roughly 15 percent of its total loans, giving
Argentina quite a bit of leverage.
40. In September 2003 the Kirchner government made an oﬀer to bondholders that in-
volved writing down 75 percent of the value of the defaulted debt, nonpayment of interest ar-
rears, and the issuance of new low-interest bonds, amounting to a cut of up to 90 percent in
the net present value of the bonds. The Argentine Bondholders’ Committee made a counter-
oﬀer that accepted a write-oﬀ of 35 percent in the nominal value of the defaulted debt and re-
quired payment of overdue interest payments. The 2005 agreement is virtually identical to the
terms of this counteroﬀer.
41. See the Economist (2005) for further description of the current economic and political
situation in Argentina.Appendix
Argentina’s Financial Market Event Time Line
1989
July 9 Carlos Menem assumes the Argentine presidency in the
ﬁrst peaceful transfer of power from one democratically
elected leader to another since 1928.
November New Foreign Investment Regime put into place. All legal
limits on foreign investment abolished. Capital gains and
dividends can now be repatriated freely. No need for pre-
vious approval of transactions. No legal limits regarding
type or nature of foreign investment. Introduction of a
free exchange rate regime. Bekaert and Harvey identify
this as the oﬃcial liberalization date.
December The exchange system is again uniﬁed for all dealings un-
der a free-ﬂoating rate and the currency unit depreciated.
Dual export rates still exist.
1990
March Currency made fully convertible. Foreign portfolio in-
vestment by Argentine residents now possible.
November Menem extends value added tax to services, implements
tax on ﬁxed assets.
1991
March 22 Export taxes are eliminated, abolishing the dual export
rates.
April  1 Argentina’s Congress enacts the Convertibility Law,
which legally adopts the currency board guaranteeing the
convertibility of peso currency to dollars at a one-to-one
ﬁxed rate and limiting the printing of pesos to only an
amount necessary to purchase dollars in the foreign ex-
change market. Eﬀectively, each peso in circulation is
backed by a U.S. dollar, and monetary policy is forcibly
constrained to uphold that promise.
August Law protecting dollar-denominated deposits enacted.
October Argentina Fund begins. This fund marks the ﬁrst time
U.S. investors can invest in a mutual fund that represents
a broad part of the market. Deregulation decree reforms
domestic industry, external trade, and capital markets.
The deregulation decree eliminates capital gains taxes for
foreigners.
1992 Argentina enjoys strong economic growth, and the cur-
rency board is considered highly successful.
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now be made on the free market at free negotiated rates.
July Moody’s upgrades Argentina’s sovereign debt rating
from B3 to B1.
1993 The economy soars, at an annual growth rate above 5.5
percent, as inﬂation subsides and the government em-
barks on an ambitious program of deregulation, lowering
trade barriers and privatizing state-owned enterprises in-
cluding oil, telephones, and power.
March Social security reform (announcement of creation of
private pension fund system to begin operation in fu-
ture). Argentina’s Comission de Valores stipulates that
only ﬁnancial intermediary ﬁrms belonging to self-
regulating organizations can participate in public oﬀer-
ing of securities. This move attempts to cut down on in-
sider trading on the Buenos Aires exchange.
April 7 Swaps of bonds for eligible debts agreed to under the
Brady Plan by Argentina and foreign creditor banks be-
gins to take place in accordance with the debt and debt
service reduction operations.
May Import tariﬀs on capital goods abolished and a 15 per-
cent tax reimbursement to capital goods producers estab-
lished.
August Standard & Poor’s (S&P) assigns ﬁrst-time rating of BB–
to sovereign debt.
1994
March 28 Swaps of bonds for eligible debts agreed to under the
Brady Plan by Argentina and foreign creditor banks are
completed.
August First T-bill auction in twenty years held.
December 20 Mexican peso devaluation followed by a withdrawal of
foreign investors from Latin American countries, leading
to banking crises: eight banks are suspended and three
banks collapse. Events weaken position of wholesale
banks that have signiﬁcant inventories of government se-
curities on which they are incurring capital losses due to
the increase in interest rates. Nonﬁnancial ﬁrms are
aﬀected as well. Central bank provides emergency liquid-
ity assistance.
December 28 Reserve requirements reduced on dollar deposits in order
to provide more liquidity to the banking system.
1995 Following Mexico’s December 1994 peso devaluation,
capital ﬂows out of emerging markets. Argentina’s GDP
declines by 2.8 percent.
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Core Common Market (Mercosur), becomes eﬀective.
January 15 Reserve requirements on peso deposits lowered and a
special security fund managed by Banco Nacion set up to
assist institutions that suﬀered high deposit withdrawals.
February Trust Fund for Provincial Development set up to help
support provincial banks.
March Tax of 3 percent reimposed on all imports, with the ex-
ception of capital goods, fuel, and goods produced in the
paper, computer, and telecommunications sectors. All
goods imported from the member countries of Mercosur
are also exempt. Trust Fund for Bank Capitalization es-
tablished; changes made to the central bank charter to
allow it to use repurchase agreements and rediscounts to
help troubled banks. New loan agreements made with the
IMF, World Bank, and IBD; issuance of new bonds to in-
crease international reserves and fund the trust funds.
April A limited system of deposit insurance is introduced in re-
sponse to the banking crisis. Provincial sales tax consid-
ered in exchange for lower social security contributions.
May New rules for bank reserve requirements implemented.
President Menem is reelected after convincing Congress
to change electoral laws that prohibit a second term.
August Bank reserve requirement for checking and savings ac-
counts lowered from 33 percent to 30 percent; the 2 per-
cent reserve requirement for time deposits eliminated.
1996 The central bank announces the creation of a $6 billion
emergency fund to strengthen the banking sector. Labor
reform allows companies to reduce payroll expenses by
ﬁring workers without severance pay.
July 26 Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo is dismissed.
August Tax increases on fuel and public transportation. Govern-
ment announces plans to increase personal asset tax on
holdings over $100,000 to 1 percent.
September Economic hardship leads to a general strike.
1997 Removal of most entry barriers and branching restric-
tions of the banking sector.
April S&P raises sovereign debt rating to BB and upgrades thir-
teen private companies to investment grade.
July East Asian ﬁnancial crisis begins.
1998 Argentina enters prolonged recession in third quarter;
unemployment begins to rise.
February The IMF approves a three-year $2.8 billion line of credit
to support Argentina’s economic reform program. The
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added tax (VAT) on basic consumer goods. The top cor-
porate tax rate would rise to 35 percent from 33 percent
and reduce by 10 percent the social security contributions
by employees.
August Russia announces a partial default on its sovereign
bonds.
1999
January 13 Brazil devalues its currency.
September The Argentine Congress passes the Fiscal Responsibility
Law, committing to large reductions in both federal and
provincial government spending.
October 24 Fernando de la Rua of the Radical Civic Union (UCR),
the opposition coalition candidate, running on a plat-
form to end corruption (under Menem) and the reces-
sion, defeats Peronist candidate Eduardo Duhalde for
president. De la Rua inherits $114 billion public debt.
December  10 De la Rua is inaugurated president of Argentina and
shortly thereafter seeks assistance from the IMF.
2000 Strikes and fuel tax protests. Beef exports slump after an
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Soy exports suﬀer
from concerns over the use of genetically modiﬁed vari-
eties.
March 10 The IMF agrees to three-year $7.2 billion standby ar-
rangement with Argentina conditioned on a strict ﬁscal
adjustment and the assumption of 3.5 percent GDP
growth in 2000 (actual growth was 0.5 percent).
May 29 The government announces $1 billion in budget cuts in
hopes that ﬁscal responsibility will bring renewed conﬁ-
dence to economy.
December 18 The de la Rua government announces a $40 billion multi-
lateral assistance package organized by IMF.
2001
January  12 Argentina’s continued poor economic performance
prompts the IMF to augment the March 10, 2000, agree-
ment by $7.0 billion as part of a $40 billion assistance
package involving the Inter-American Development
Bank, the World Bank, Spain, and private lenders. The
agreement assumes that GDP will grow at a rate of 2.5
percent in 2001 (versus actual decline of 5.0 percent).
March 19 Domingo Cavallo, minister of economy under Menem
and architect of the currency board ten years earlier, re-
places Ricardo Lopez Murphy, who resigns as minister of
economy.
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eign rating (S&P from BB to B  and Moody’s from B1
to B2).
March 28 Minister Cavallo secures “emergency powers” from Con-
gress. Cavallo announces economic program comprising
a tax on bank transactions, changes in other taxes and
tariﬀs, and sectoral “competitiveness plans.”
April Central bank reduces liquidity requirements and allows
banks to include government securities up to 2 billion pe-
sos among liquidity requirements.
May 8 S&P lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating fur-
ther from B  to B.
June 3 Authorities announce the completion of the “megaswap.”
Government bonds with a face value of $29.5 billion are
voluntarily exchanged for longer-term instruments.
June 15 Minister Cavallo announces package of tax and trade
measures, including a trade compensation mechanism
for exporters and importers of nonenergy goods.
June 16–17 The de la Rua government announces a $29.5 billion vol-
untary debt restructuring in which short-term debt is ex-
changed for new debt with longer maturities and higher
interest rates.
June 19 The peso exchange rate for merchandise trade is priced at
a ﬁfty-ﬁfty dollar-euro peg, eﬀectively allowing a 7 per-
cent devaluation for foreign trade in hopes of improving
Argentina’s international competitiveness. Many ana-
lysts raise concerns over the eﬀects on the credibility of
the convertibility regime.
July Much of the country is brought to a standstill by a gen-
eral strike in protest against proposed government spend-
ing cuts. Risk rating agencies lower Argentina’s long-
term sovereign rating further (S&P from B to B– and
Moody’s ﬁrst from B2 to B3 and then from B3 to Caa1).
July 10 Government pays yield of 14.1 percent to place $827 mil-
lion of ninety-day paper.
July  11 Minister Cavallo announces drastic program of ﬁscal
adjustment aimed at eliminating the federal govern-
ment deﬁcit from August 2001 onward (the “zero-deﬁcit
plan”).
July  30 Senate approves the zero-deﬁcit plan (lower house of
Congress had approved it on July 20).
August 21 IMF announces likely $8 billion augmentation of Ar-
gentina’s standby credit.
328 Kathryn M. E. Dominguez and Linda L. TesarSeptember 7 IMF approves augmentation of standby credit to about
$21.6 billion and completes Fourth Review.
September 20 The central bank activates the contingent repurchase fa-
cility with international banks, boosting gross reserves
by about $1.2 billion ($500 million was disbursed in Oc-
tober).
October 9–12 Risk rating agencies lower Argentina’s long-term sover-
eign rating further (S&P from B– to CCC and Moody’s
from Caa1 to Caa3).
October 16 Preset date for Congressional elections. The Peronist op-
position takes control of both houses of Parliament. Cav-
allo and ﬁnancial markets (erroneously) expect that a ﬁs-
cal deal can be worked out after the elections (on the
17th).
October 28 Minister Cavallo starts negotiations with the IMF and
the U.S. Treasury to purchase collateral for new Argen-
tine bonds to be issued in an exchange for the nearly $100
billion of local and external debt.
October 29 Cavallo deﬁnes the debt exchange operation as voluntary.
The old debt would exchange for bonds paying 7 percent
per year and be guaranteed by tax revenues. The IMF and
U.S. Treasury require compliance with a zero deﬁcit and
an agreement with the provinces on tax revenue sharing
before any kind of ﬁnancial support is given.
October 30 S&P lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating from
CCC  to CC.
November 1 The authorities announce a new ﬁscal package, including
a new batch of competitiveness plans, the rebate of VAT
payments on debit card transactions, a temporary reduc-
tion in employee social security contributions, a corpo-
rate debt restructuring scheme, and a tax amnesty that
writes oﬀ interest and penalty obligations accrued
through the end of September 2001.
November 6 S&P lowers Argentina’s long-term sovereign rating from
CC to SD (selective default). Argentina conducts a sec-
ond debt swap, exchanging $60 billion of bonds with an
average interest rate of 11–12 percent for extended matu-
rity notes carrying only a 7 percent interest rate. Interna-
tional bond rating agencies consider it an eﬀective de-
fault.
November 19 The IMF announces it will not make any new disburse-
ments without being satisﬁed that Argentina has secured
the goals previously designated.
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posits, by imposing a 100 percent liquidity requirement
on deposits paying an interest rate more than 1 percent-
age point above average of all local banks.
November 30 End of a debt swap with local banks and pension funds
for more than $55 billion (over a total public debt of
$160 billion). The authorities announce completion of
the local leg of the debt restructuring. Government
bonds with a face value of $41 billion at the federal level
and $10 billion at the provincial level are “voluntarily”
exchanged.
December Economy Minister Cavallo announces sweeping restric-
tions to halt an exodus of bank deposits. The IMF stops
$1.3 billion in aid.
December  2 The government announces temporary capital control
regime (termed Corralito) involving bank withdrawal
limits and limits on dollar transfers abroad as a last-ditch
eﬀort to fend oﬀa devaluation and prevent a major bank-
ing crisis. Withdrawals are limited to 250 pesos (dollars)
per week per account. Depositors, however, may still ac-
cess funds for larger purchases through checks or debit
cards and transfer their money among banks. Holders of
deposits may also exchange them for federal bonds
(BODENs) maturing in 2005, 2007, or 2012 in a Canje ex-
change. No limits are placed on domestic payments made
with checks, credits, debit cards, and electronic MEP
(metodo electronico de pagos) payments.
December 3 The capital control measures announced on December 2
come into full eﬀect through Decree 1570-01 on Decem-
ber 3:
• Wire transfers suspended except with prior central
bank approval.
• Cash withdrawals from the banking system limited to
$1,000 per month.
• Argentine ﬁnancial institutions prohibited from for-
eign currency futures transactions.
• Argentine ﬁnancial institutions prohibited from issu-
ing new bank loans denominated in Argentine pesos.
All new loans must be issued in U.S. dollars, and exist-
ing peso loans must be converted to U.S. dollar loans at
a one-to-one rate.
• Foreign investors trading in the Argentine Securities
Market subject to repatriation restrictions. Funds re-
lated to securities transactions must remain in the
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measure is oﬃcially revoked.
December 5 The IMF withholds $1.24 billion loan installment, citing
Argentina’s repeated inability to meet ﬁscal targets.
December 7 Argentina announces it can no longer guarantee payment
on foreign debt.
December 10 The central bank imposes a 98 percent reserve require-
ment on deposit increases after December 1, 2001, aimed
at limiting ﬂight to quality within the system.
December 13 A twenty-four-hour general strike is held in protest at
curbs on bank withdrawals, delayed pension payouts, and
other measures. Phase one of the government debt ex-
change is completed.
December 19 State of emergency is declared to stop protests against
Minister Cavallo’s economic policies. The lower house of
Congress repeals the special legislative powers granted to
Cavallo.
December 20 President De la Rua and Minister Cavallo resign after
days of riots and protests that leave over twenty demon-
strators dead. A banking holiday is declared for Decem-
ber 21, extended through December 26. Moody’s lowers
Argentina ratings to Ca from Caa3. Ramon Puerta be-
comes interim president. Country risk reaches 4,618
points. Global (sovereign) bond yields reach their histor-
ical maximum of 49 percent annual return in dollars.
December 21 The oﬃcial Foreign Exchange Rate market is closed.
December 23 Rodriguez Saa becomes the new interim president for
sixty days. He declares the suspension of external debt
payments for at least sixty days, totaling $166 billion in
federal and provincial debt.
December 24 The government announces that a new ﬁat currency (i.e.,
without foreign currency backing) will be created (the ar-
gentino).
December 26 The liquidity standards for banks are relaxed. Rodriguez
Saa announces a new economic plan based on (a) sus-
pension of payments on public debt, (b) new job creation
program, and (c) creation of new currency (the argentino)
to begin circulating in January 2002 and not to be con-
vertible to the U.S. dollar.
December 30 President Saa resigns after his emergency policies are re-
jected by the Peronist governors.
2002
January 1 Congress elects Peronist Senator Eduardo Duhalde as
caretaker president.
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to conclude the remaining period of the de la Rua presi-
dency; President Duhalde announces the end of convert-
ibility and the introduction of a dual foreign exchange
regime.
January 4 Leak reported in the ﬁnancial press suggests that a 40
percent devaluation is imminent.
January 5 The Argentine stock market is closed.
January 6 The Argentine Congress votes to establish the Law of
Economic Emergency and abolish the Convertibility
Law. After the Argentine Congress passes necessary leg-
islation, President Duhalde announces the end of the cur-
rency board and a plan to devalue the peso by 29 percent
(to 1.4 to the dollar) for major foreign commercial trans-
actions, with a ﬂoating rate for all other transactions.
Other elements of economic plan include converting all
debts up to $100,000 to pesos (passing on devaluation
cost to creditors), capital and bank account controls, a
new tax on oil to compensate creditors for the losses that
will ensue, renegotiation of public debt, and a balanced
budget.
January 7 The new minister of ﬁnance, Lenicov, announces the de-
valuation of the peso and the establishment of a new dual
foreign exchange rate regime, to be implemented on Jan-
uary 9, 2002.
January 10 Government announces it will guarantee dollar deposits,
but to curtail bank runs, the $1,000 (1,500 peso) limit on
monthly withdrawals is maintained and all checking and
savings accounts with balances exceeding $10,000 and
$3,000, respectively, will be converted to certiﬁcates of de-
posit and remain frozen for at least one year. Smaller de-
posits have the option of earlier withdrawal by moving to
peso-denominated accounts at the 1.4 exchange rate.
January 11 After several delays, the exchange rate market reopens,
and the new dual exchange rate system is put in place:
• 1 Argentinean peso  1 U.S. dollar parity (Convertibil-
ity Plan) is abolished.
• All debts (capital and interest) in Argentine currency
with ﬁnancial entities—converted into U.S. dollars ac-
cording to Decree 1570-01—will be reconverted into
the original currency (pesos).
• The oﬃcial, ﬁxed conversion rate of 1 U.S. dollar   1.4
pesos is relevant for foreign trade operations. The free
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freely determined by the market.
January 16 The IMF approves request for one-year extension of $936
million payment due January 17, keeping Argentina from
falling into arrears.
January  17 Argentine stock market reopens. The government an-
nounces that dollar-denominated loans exceeding
$100,000 will be converted to pesos at 1.4 for ﬁxed rate,
deepening the balance sheet mismatch of banks.
January  19–20 Duhalde reverses his decision to guarantee dollar de-
posits, which will be converted to pesos at some unde-
ﬁned devalued exchange rate.
January  21 The government announces the easing of bank with-
drawal restrictions:
• Up to 7,000 pesos can be withdrawn from term deposits
in pesos (transferring that money to a checking ac-
count)
• Up to $5,000 can be withdrawn from term deposits in
dollars (transferring that money to a checking account
at the oﬃcial exchange rate, 1.4).
• Up to $5,000 in a savings account can be pesoﬁed at the
oﬃcial exchange rate.
January 23 The Argentine Senate passes bankruptcy law that would
use capital controls to restrict foreign private debt pay-
ments through December 2003.
January 24 Utility tariﬀs are frozen indeﬁnitely.
January 30 Argentina’s Chamber of Deputies passes controversial
bankruptcy law, stripping it of the Senate provision pro-
hibiting foreign debt payments, but other capital controls
remain in eﬀect. The law retains language allowing con-
version of dollar-denominated debt below $100,000 to
pesos at one-to-one rate (beneﬁtting debtors) and sus-
pending creditor action on loan debt defaults for 180
days.
February 3 Lenicov announces an asymmetric pesoﬁcation and the
end of the dual exchange rate regime:
• All dollar deposits are pesoﬁed at 1.4 pesos per dollar.
• Corporate and consumer debts are also pesoﬁed, but at
the exchange rate prevailing during the Convertibility
Plan period. Both deposits and credit will be indexed to
inﬂation.
• The dual exchange rate regime is replaced by a uniﬁed
ﬂoating exchange rate determined by market forces.
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come from the Corralito without any amount restric-
tions (before, workers could only extract up to 1,500 pe-
sos). Corralon starts, which freezes bank term deposits
(holders of term deposits have the option to convert
them into CEDROs or BODENs maturing in 2007 or
2012 in a Canje exchange).
February 4 The government decrees the uniﬁcation of the exchange
rate regime and the asymmetric pesoﬁcation of bank bal-
ance sheets (assets at one-to-one rate and liabilities at 1.4
pesos to dollar). The oﬃcial foreign exchange market is
closed.
February 11 The central bank establishes a new uniﬁed free foreign
exchange market, which replaces the two markets—oﬃ-
cial and free—implemented in January. The exchange rate
market reopens, and the ﬂoating dollar exchange rate
reaches 2.1 pesos, well below the devaluation expecta-
tions built into asset prices.
February  27 The federal government and the provincial governors
reach agreement on a temporary revenue-sharing ar-
rangement that abolishes the minimum ﬂoor on transfers
to the provinces in exchange for (a) the broadening of the
coparticipation base to include the ﬁnancial transactions
tax, and (b) better terms for their debt servicing. The
provinces commit to reducing ﬁscal deﬁcits by 60 percent
in 2002 and achieving balance in 2003.
March 5 Export taxes of 10 percent and 5 percent are imposed on
primary products and process agricultural and industrial
products, respectively.
March 8 The pesoﬁcation of government debt under Argentine
law is decreed.
March 13 A voluntary bond swap (Swap I) is decreed authorizing
the exchange of reprogrammed time deposits for govern-
ment bonds. The decree also authorizes issuance of
bonds to banks in compensation for the asymmetric pe-
soﬁcation of their balance sheets.
March 25 The peso exchange rate reaches a peak of 4 pesos per dol-
lar. To contain the depreciation of the currency, the au-
thorities intervene heavily in the foreign exchange market
($800 million in March), tighten access to central bank
liquidity assistance (a matching dollar from the parent
now being requested as a condition for assistance to for-
eign banks), and introduce a variety of exchange regula-
tions aﬀecting banks, foreign exchange bureaus, and ex-
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alone, bringing the total for the month of March to about
ﬁfty.
March 26 The central bank announces new measures related to for-
eign exchange transactions and ADR-CEDEAR conver-
sions aimed at improving the functioning of the foreign
currency market and regulating the buying and selling of
foreign currency by order and for the account of the cen-
tral bank. The press communication also mentions that
there will be coordination between the Comision Na-
cional de Valores (CNV) and the Bolsa de Comercio de
Buenos Aires (BCBA) in order to adopt new measures to
regulate capital outﬂows via ADR and CEDEAR trans-
actions.
April Banking and foreign exchange activity suspended;
Duhalde says the ﬁnancial system may collapse.
April 9 Export taxes on agricultural primary products increased
to 20–23.5 percent.
April  19 The central banks suspends Scotiabank Quilmes for
thirty days. A bank holiday is declared until Congress ap-
proves a solution to the problem of judicial injunctions
(amparos) releasing bank deposits. The authorities begin
working on a plan (the so-called BONEX II plan) to
convert reprogrammed time deposits into government
bonds.
April 20 Economy Minister Remes Lenicov presents to congress
the BONEX II plan; the draft law is rejected, and Minis-
ter Remes resigns.
April  23 President Duhalde reaches agreement with provincial
governors on a fourteen-point Federal-Provincial Pact.
April 25 Congress approves the Ley Tapón to ease pressure from
the amparos. The law modiﬁes court procedures and
states that depositors can only access funds once the ju-
dicial process is over; in the meantime funds are de-
posited in an escrow account.
May 6 Congress approves the February Federal-Provincial Pact.
May 15 Congress approves law that reverses the most harmful
provisions of the January emergency law and makes lim-
ited improvements to the insolvency law.
May 30 The Economic Subversion Law is repealed.
May 31 In order to tighten control over the sale of export receipts,
the central bank announces that dollar export revenues in
excess of $1 million will have to be sold directly to the cen-
tral bank. Buenos Aires and the federal government sign
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annexes (quarterly ﬁscal targets and calendar for dis-
bursement) is reached in June.
June  1 President Duhalde signs the Options Plan on repro-
grammed deposits, a revised version of former Minister
Remes’s BONEX II Plan, giving depositors the option to
exchange deposits into bonds.
June 18 The minimum level of export proceeds that should be sur-
rendered to the central bank lowered from $1 million to
$500,000.
July Duhalde calls early elections for March 2003, later put
back to April, to try to win public support for the gov-
ernment’s handling of the economic crisis.
July 9 In response to a class action suit lodged by the country’s
ombudsman on behalf of all depositors, a federal court
declares the deposit freeze and pesoﬁcation unconstitu-
tional.
July  24 The government issued a decree suspending court-
ordered withdrawals of frozen bank deposits for 120 busi-
ness days.
July  25 The decree suspending deposit withdrawals obtained
through court orders is declared partially unconstitu-
tional by a federal judge.
July 26 Following a demand by the national ombudsman, a judge
rules unconstitutional the government decree suspending
lawsuits on December’s bank curbs for 120 business days.
July 29 A panel of monetary policy experts makes public several
proposals to resolve the country’s ﬁnancial crisis, includ-
ing a monetary policy anchor, an independent central
bank, the ending of peso-printing deﬁcit ﬁnancing, and
an end to the use of quasi-currencies by the provinces.
The report calls for a ﬂoating exchange rate and urges
Argentina to stop using international reserves to support
the peso.
August  15 Congress approves a bill extending for ninety days
(through mid-November 2002) the provision that sus-
pends certain kinds of creditor-initiated nonbankruptcy
law enforcement actions. Congress also approves a bill
extending for sixty days (through end September 2002)
the application of price indexation to loans.
August 22 The Supreme Court declares unconstitutional the 13 per-
cent salary cut for federal government workers and pen-
sioners, implemented from July 2001.
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of bank compensation bonds for the asymmetric pesoﬁ-
cation.
August 28 A federal court establishes that parent banks should be
fully responsible for the liabilities of subsidiaries in Ar-
gentina.
September The central bank passes a very restrictive regulation (cir-
cular 3723) that mandates that every stock be traded in its
underlying currency. After intense opposition from the
ﬁnancial community, the central bank rescinds 3723
andinstead passes a resolution (circular 3727) that forbids
“contra cable” operations. These operations allow bro-
kers to sell stocks purchased in Buenos Aires instanta-
neously in New York (or any foreign market) using the
Merval as a clearinghouse. Under 3727 it is still possible
for investors in Argentina to convert CEDEARs and sell
them in New York, but this new restriction signiﬁcantly
increases the transaction costs of doing so.
September 3 The government introduces new exchange controls in an
attempt to boost international reserves and defend the
peso:
• The limit for exporters’ foreign exchange surrender to
the central bank is reduced from $500,000 to $200,000.
• The minimum maturity of external debt contracted by
private nonﬁnancial entities is set to ninety days.
• Exchange bureaus are required to deposit with the cen-
tral bank foreign exchange holdings exceeding $1.5 mil-
lion on a daily basis.
• The net dollar positions held by exchange dealers oper-
ating on behalf of the central bank are reduced by an
average 40 percent.
September 5 The federal administrative dispute chamber, an appellate
court, rules that the decrees establishing the Corralitoand
pesoﬁcation were unconstitutional. The ruling applies to
only one case, but it opens the door for further similar
rulings.
September 9 Further tightening of foreign exchange controls: prior au-
thorization from the central bank is required for dollar
purchases exceeding $100,000 for portfolio and other ﬁ-
nancial investments abroad, as well as for the purchase of
foreign banknotes.
September  13 The Federal Court of Appeals declares the Corralito,
pesoﬁcation, and the 120 days’ suspension of executions
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lows depositors to claim their deposits in court immedi-
ately. The 2003 budget is submitted to Congress.
September 17 The government issues a decree that extends the negotia-
tion period for utility tariﬀs for another 120 days with the
possibility of a further 60-day extension.
September 20 The government launches a second swap of bonds for
frozen deposits and announces the easing of restrictions
on frozen time deposits of up to 7,000 pesos.
October  31 The monthly cash withdrawal limit on the Corralito
raised to 2,000 pesos from 1,200 pesos.
November Argentina defaults on an $800 million debt repayment to the
World Bank, having failed to resecure IMF aid. The World
Bank says it will not consider new loans for the country.
November  11 After discussions with the government, the banks an-
nounce a voluntary seventy-ﬁve-day stay on foreclosures.
November 14 The government fails to fully meet an $809 million World
Bank debt payment; only $79.2 million in interest is paid.
President Duhalde signs a decree lowering the VAT rate
by 2 percentage points.
November 15 A lower court suspends the public hearings designed to
grant a tariﬀ increase to the privatized utility companies.
November 18 President Duhalde signs a twelve-point agreement with
provincial governors and some key legislators over the
new election timetable and the government’s economic
policies.
November 21 The Senate approves President Duhalde’s plans for delay-
ing the presidential election by a month to April. The ﬁrst
round of presidential elections is scheduled to be held on
April 27, 2003, and will be followed by a second round on
May 10 if necessary.
November 22 The government announces that it will lift the remaining
Corralito restrictions on sight accounts eﬀective Decem-
ber 2. Term deposits (the corralon) remain frozen. Minis-
ter Lavagna submits a draft decree to President Duhalde
lifting the tariﬀrates on electricity and natural gas. On av-
erage, electricity rates will rise 9.0 percent and natural gas
7.2 percent.
November 27 An executive decree is issued authorizing court-imposed
stay on foreclosures for thirty business days, during
which time mediation is required.
December 2 Corralito rescinded.
December 9 The resignation of Central Bank President Pignanelli is
accepted by President Duhalde.
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tral bank president. Legislation eliminating the ability of
the executive to grant tax amnesties becomes eﬀective.
December 11 A court order reverses the decreed increases in electricity
and gas tariﬀs.
2003
March 9 The Supreme Court rules that conversion to pesos was
illegal. According to the central bank, approximately
$8,760 million is at stake.
May Nestor Kirchner sworn in as president. Former President
Carlos Menem gains most votes in ﬁrst round of elections
but pulls out before second round.
September 10 Argentine ﬁnance oﬃcials reach an agreement with the
IMF for a three-year $12.6 billion standby credit. Under
the terms of the new arrangement, the government
pledges to raise the consolidated primary ﬁscal surplus
from 2.5 percent of GDP this year to 3.0 percent next
year.
2004
April 9 Argentina decides to make a $3.1 billion payment to the
IMF, a retreat from a vow by Buenos Aires that it would
not pay up unless the IMF signaled that it would approve
an upcoming report on Argentina’s economic progress as
part of the 2003 accord.
July 2 Argentina ﬁles a shelf registration statement with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, completing the
documentation needed to seek regulatory approval in the
United States for a debt exchange to restructure some
$100 billion in defaulted debt.
August Argentina suspends its agreement with the IMF but con-
tinues to repay its debts as they come in.
October 26 The Supreme Court rules that the conversion of ﬁxed-
term savings in dollars to pesos—known as pesoﬁca-
tion—was legal, relieving the banks of large potential
losses from further injunctions.
2005
February A majority of Republic of Argentina bondholders sur-
render their claims in exchange for new bonds worth
roughly thirty-ﬁve cents on the dollar.
December Kirchner says his government will repay its entire $9.8 bil-
lion debt to the IMF early—before the end of 2005.
Sources: Ambito Financiero (http://www.ambitoweb.com), La Nacion (http://www.lana-
cion.com.architecture), Clarin(http://www.clarin.com), Pictet (http://www.pictet.com), BBC
News (http://www.news.bbc.co.uk), IMF (2003), and Bekaert and Harvey (2003).
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Comment Nicolas Magud
This paper does a stupendous job of describing in a detailed but concise
way the reforms that took place in Argentina during the 1990s. It then
draws on this description to narrate the incredibly fast unfolding of the re-
forms that occurred during the ﬁrst years of the 2000s, emphasizing the
capital controls episode that took place during December 2001–December
2002, known as the “corralito.” Let me succinctly provide a summary of the
paper, along with some comments on the facts and implemented (or not)
policies, as well as the authors’ explanation of them.
During the 1990s Argentina moved from being a hyperinﬂationary
country to being the darling of international capital markets, to return
later—by the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s—to being the spoiled
one once again. The authors thoroughly describe the set of reforms put
into place during these years. They then ask the question: was it bad luck,
or bad policies? And they answer that both were responsible for the ob-
served facts. I deﬁnitely agree with them, but I will disagree in some of the
bad, or should I say missing, policies prior to the fall of the convertibility
plan, and after the capital controls in which it ended.
The authors correctly ascertain that the currency board is partly guilty
because, as they say, it is a double-edged sword: it buys low inﬂation and
credibility, but at a potentially very high price (should you not accompany
it with the corresponding ﬁscal soundness). For the convertibility plan to
be eﬀective (i.e., credible), it required increasing escape clause costs. This
generated an increasing degree of liability dollarization (dollar-
denominated debts), facilitating the dollarization of the private sector,
and leaving the economy with a question: what if the exchange rate depre-
ciates? In a sense, these high escape clause costs were just necessary for the
convertibility plan to be successful.
A related question is why the peso was anchored to the dollar, given that
Argentina’s share of trade with the United States is small compared to
Brazil and the EU. And for this I have a nonacademic explanation. The
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Nicolas Magud is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Oregon.representative Argentine agent saves in dollars, no matter what (at least, it
used to until recently). Let me oﬀer support—loosely speaking—by way
of a personal anecdote, since I am from Argentina. When I was young, my
father taught me that if I was ever able to save any money, I should neverde-
posit that money into a savings or checking account. I should go to the ex-
change market, buy dollars, and put those dollars into a safe box. Clearly,
this is not an academic explanation, but it works as a good example of Ar-
gentine thinking. As of the early 1990s the representative Argentine saved
in dollars, so the convertibility plan was nothing but an exchange rate–
based stabilization plan using the currency that Argentines used as a store
of value as the anchor of the system.
But, again, the ﬁscal part of the story is crucial to an understanding of
the path of events in Argentina. The country historically experienced a
lack of coordination between the national government and provincial gov-
ernments. Traditionally, most provincial governments spend as much as
they can (many of them mainly in public servants), and then they require
more funds to keep on operating.1
On top of this, the second half of the 1990s experienced another phe-
nomenon, but of a political rather than an economic nature. During these
years, Eduardo Duhalde, the governor of Buenos Aires, wanted to run for
president in the 1999 election. For this purpose, he started spending big to
gain political support among voters, many times spending money on white
elephants. At the same time, President Carlos Menem wanted to get a third
presidency—despite its being unconstitutional—and in order to secure
the support of most of the other provinces, he also started to spend big. At
the same time, he did not want to appear ﬁscally irresponsible. In table 7.1
of the paper, we can observe that the national government ﬁscal balance
was apparently under control. But, interestingly, the provincial ﬁscal ac-
counts were experiencing high deﬁcits.
Related to the ﬁscal problem, some commentators argued that, in re-
sponse to the mounting recession in 1999, expansionary ﬁscal policy could
have been used as countercyclical policy. But there is also good empirical
evidence documenting the expansionary eﬀects of contractionary ﬁscal
policy (see Alesina and Perotti 1997, among others). A highly indebted
country (which is an idiosyncratic measure, as documented by Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ 2004), can reduce domestic market interest rates by reducing
its ﬁscal deﬁcit and consequently its ﬁnancing needs: demand for credit de-
creases, thus increasing investment (see Magud 2002). In this case, a pos-
sible mistake of President Fernando de la Rua’s government was not to im-
plement contractionary ﬁscal policy during 1999–2000, but rather not to
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1. It is commonly remarked that many times the job of a provincial ﬁnance minister is to try
to spend as much as possible and, when funds run out, call Buenos Aires to ask the national
government for more money.do as much as necessary for it to be expansionary (if private investors per-
ceive the ﬁscal consolidation as being insuﬃcient, investment does not
“take oﬀ”). Furthermore, given that the country was just getting out of a
recession, it could have been more expansionary to reduce public expendi-
tures instead of increasing taxes, so as not to reduce the private-sector de-
mand for goods and services (which is the exact point made by Alesina and
Perotti). Also, reducing public expenditures reduces the demand for non-
tradable goods—public expenditures are mostly in nontradables—and
thus helps depreciate the real exchange rate, boosting net exports.
Other criticisms of the convertibility plan were that it failed to (1) con-
solidate the budget constraint of central and provincial governments,
(2) provide deep banking system regulations, and (3) reduce labor market
rigidities. It was also blamed for lacking an exit strategy, and there also ex-
isted doubts about its long-run feasibility. All these points are valid, but it
is worth mentioning that this is asking one instrument to perform many ac-
tivities at the same time. And we know that that does not work. The sole
objective of the convertibility plan was to reduce high inﬂation rates, which
it did. There were, as the paper thoroughly documents, many other paral-
lel reforms to account for these other problems. As the facts showed, some
of these reforms were not as successful as expected. And, once more, the
lack of an exit strategy is a tricky point. Had one existed, credibility issues
could have been raised that would probably have undermined most of the
inﬂation reduction eﬀects that the convertibility plan brought about.
As stated above, the authors claim that Argentina’s problems were both
the existence of external shocks and the lack of adaptive policies. I deﬁ-
nitely agree with them. But I will claim that the lack of adaptive policies
was more important during the second half of the 1990s than after 1999,
as the authors highlight. And for this purpose I will ﬁrst refer to table 7.1
in the paper. We can observe that Argentina’s external debt increased
throughout the 1990s (which relates to the “debt intolerance” in Reinhart,
Rogoﬀ, and Savastano 2003). During the ﬁrst half of the decade, we can at-
tribute this in part to the recognition of previously ﬂoating debt—trade
credit that the government was not paying and that the government put in
written terms to enhance the credibility of the plan—and to the privatiza-
tion of the social security system, which is expansionary for any economy
that is not dynamically ineﬃcient, like Argentina. Also, de Pablo (2005)
shows that once the ﬂoating debt is included, during the ﬁrst half of the
1990s the debt level actually decreases, contrary to what most people think!
But more can be extracted from table 7.1 in the paper. Looking at the
real eﬀective exchange rate series, a continuous appreciation is observed
(see also ﬁgure 7.7 in the paper), especially during the late 1990s—and par-
ticularly when external shocks took place: 1997–2000. Wasn’t this a good
opportunity to reduce government expenditures, thus contributing to in-
creased sustainability of the ﬁscal sector, as well as reducing pressures on
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imbalance increased instead of decreasing during these years (despite a
growing economy during 1991–98, so it was not taxes—at least those di-
rectly due to a markedly lower revenue—that was driving the deﬁcit). And
here both the central government and the provinces are to blame. Al-
though it is a counterfactual, these years could have been very good times
to perform a sharp ﬁscal adjustment, especially during 1996 and 1997,
when the economy growth rate was still high (and in 1998, although it was
not as big, the growth rate was still decent).
The 1990s brought a very good thing to the Argentine economy: an in-
crease in the debt maturity proﬁle. As of September 1999, of an external
debt of $118.8 billion, 97 percent was long term. However, 8.7 percent of
that long-term debt was due in 2000! (See ﬁgure 7C.1.) Furthermore, the
amortization schedule of Argentina’s public debt included heavy payments
during 2000–2005, as can be seen in ﬁgure 7C.2. So, in a sense, the bomb
was already there.
And then came the Duhalde administration (January 2002), probably
the worst of all of them, and deserving more attention than it attracted in
this paper. Capital controls were imposed by late 2001, originally for ninety
days only. But these controls enabled people to make transactions through
the banking system. The Duhalde administration not only made the capi-
tal controls regime last longer than originally planned (if it was such a bad
thing, why didn’t his administration levy it right away?); it also did not al-
low transactions to use money through the banking sector. All in all, it just
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Fig. 7C.1 Maturity structure of Argentine public debt as of September 30, 1999:
$118.8 billionmade the capital controls more stringent than under president de la Rua’s
government.
Moreover, the short-lived government of Rodriguez Saa (which only
lasted for the ﬁnal week of December 2001) defaulted on its sovereign debt.
So when the Duhalde administration devalued the currency, there was not
a marked increase in exports, simply because there was no credit to ﬁnance
export operations. On top of this, taxes on exports were raised, curbing a
sharp increase in exports (so what was the devaluation for?). Furthermore,
the way out of convertibility was astonishingly disordered, as the authors
document in their appendix. First, the currency was devalued to 1.4 pesos
per dollar, there were multiple exchange rates, and then the exchange rate
was allowed to ﬂoat, in just a couple of months, generating speculative be-
havior. Clarin, one of the most important newspapers in the country, re-
ported in early 2002 in an interview with Finance Minister Remes Lenicov
that those were days of a trial-and-error policy (no wonder the ﬁnance min-
ister did not last long in oﬃce). During those days, it was commonly ob-
served that the government was thinking of implementing some measures,
which were made public, but many times after a couple of meetings, they
were not. This raised many time inconsistency problems at the time.
The experience in Argentina during 1991–2004 is a clear case of policy
reversals. It shows how even deep reforms can be rapidly undone, and it
demonstrates the consequences that they bring. During 2002, the govern-
ment claimed that its policy was against the ﬁnancial system—which ac-
counted for everything that happened in Argentina in the late 1990s, ac-
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Fig. 7C.2 Public debt: Amortization schedulecording to the administration’s message—and for the “productive” sector.
The government pushed a “buy Argentine” policy: consumers should buy
domestically produced goods regardless of their price.
On the other hand, the 2002–3 administration was just a transition one,
not elected by popular vote. One of its duties, then, should have been to put
the country in order to facilitate the task of the following elected president.
That was not observed. There seemed not to be any plan during this ad-
ministration. For instance, nothing was done in regard to debt restructur-
ing after the sovereign default. It was still not ﬁnished by the end of 2004,
even though the ﬁnance minister was the same one who took oﬃce in early
2002, after Remes Lenicov left (and even though international interest
rates were rising).
The newly elected government (which took oﬃce in May 2003) also con-
tributed to undoing all the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s, leading
the economy toward a populist path. Current economic policies lean to-
ward a state-led economy, trying to move the economy away from the ex-
perience of the 1990s, probably reducing Argentina’s long-term growth
and—to be optimistic—just stabilizing it in the bad equilibrium. A process
of re-statization of ﬁrms is underway, which is even absorbing ﬁrms that
were never state owned before! But, contrary to their pledge, public debt is
still in the banking system, and international borrowing has not stopped.
Moreover, despite high tax revenues—the direct consequence of an artiﬁ-
cially depreciated exchange rate and high export taxes—government ex-
penditures are rising (and for 2007 this can be expected to increase further
if the president aims at maintaining power, either through his reelection or
if one of his close aides retains the presidency). The latter circumstance is
also related to a debt swap that the Argentine government carried out in
early 2006, through which it reduced its indebtedness to the IMF, issuing
bonds that pay a higher interest rate, as the authors mention—as if this
would reduce the need for ﬁscal adjustment! Coupled with a monetary ex-
pansion to keep the exchange rate undervalued and lack of suﬃcient in-
vestment—many times resulting from a government’s failure to respect
contracts—this raises concerns about the inﬂation rate starting to pick up
again. The inﬂation rate for 2005 actually rose above 12 percent—com-
pared to an estimated rate of 8 percent in the federal budget. As of the time
of this writing, February 2006, the prospects seem the same for this year; I
would be tempted to say that the president is comfortable with an inﬂation
rate in the 10–15 percent range, as far as this makes the economy grow in
case he is looking to remain in power somehow. But from there to a new
high inﬂation process, things may turn kind of dangerous—not to mention
that it is not clear how accountable to Congress the government is for
spending revenues above what was forecast. So far the government has
used light price controls against inﬂation. Eventually, we know, if invest-
ment does not increase, the latter will prove useless or even worse, given
International Borrowing and Macroeconomic Performance in Argentina 347that they might generate some repressed inﬂation. In a sense, being forward
looking, it looks like this government prefers big booms and recession in-
stead of smooth growth—which does not sound very welfare improving.
To wrap up, I think that the paper does a superb job of describing the
facts during the 1991–2001 period. A future task will be to analyze in more
detail what happened after that, and what the short-run and long-run
eﬀects were of the convertibility plan and the corralito (the capital controls
episode). More could be said on the missing ﬁscal adjustment and lack of
corrective policies after the convertibility plan was ended, especially after
the corralito. And a ﬁnal message from the Argentina experience can be ex-
tracted by paraphrasing George Santayana: Those who do not learn from
the past are doomed to repeat it. Let’s hope we learned from this experi-
ence.
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